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The Resolution Foundation Commission on Living Standards: 
Improving the lives of people on low to middle incomes 
The Commission on Living Standards is an independent and wide ranging investigation into the 
pressures facing people on low to middle incomes in modern Britain. Its work is focused on the long 
term economic trends that are changing the reality of life on a low to middle income, from trends in 
the jobs market and tax-benefit system, to new pressures from the cost of living and modern 
working patterns. 
The Commission is bringing together a wide range of leading thinkers to examine these trends, from 
private and public sector employers to economists, experts in public opinion and representatives of 
parent networks. The Commission is independent and is engaging with politicians from across the 
spectrum. The members of the Commission are: 
 Clive Cowdery, Chairman, Resolution Group (Chair) 
 Phil Bentley, Managing Director, British Gas 
 Sir Win Bischoff, Chairman, Lloyds Banking Group 
 Professor Mike Brewer, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex 
 Dr. Chris Gibson-Smith, Non-executive Chairman, British Land 
 Gaby Hinsliff, author and former Political Editor, The Observer 
 Paul Johnson, Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 Gavin Kelly, Chief Executive, Resolution Foundation 
 Professor Stephen Machin, Research Director, Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics 
 Julie Moore, Chief Executive, University Hospitals Birmingham 
 Chris Nicholson, Director and Chief Executive, CentreForum 
 Frances O’Grady, Deputy General Secretary, TUC 
 Ben Page, Chief Executive, Ipsos MORI 
 Sally Russell, Director, Netmums 
The Commission’s work is supported and hosted by the Resolution Foundation, represented by Tina 
Alexandrou (Resolution Foundation Trustee) and James Plunkett (Secretary to the Commission). The 
Foundation will be working with a wide range of organisations in the coming months to produce a 
series of reports that will form the evidence base for the Commission’s discussions. If you would like 
to contribute to the work of the Commission, please get in touch at: 
commission@resolutionfoundation.org  
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Introduction  
The squeeze on living standards: a longer view 
The great majority of households in Britain are currently experiencing a fall in the buying power of their 
incomes. Put simply, inflation is running around 5%, and few households have seen their incomes rise by 
this amount in the past year. But for those people lucky enough to have jobs, is this causing a 
fundamental reduction in living standards, or is it just a matter of making relatively small adjustments in 
our lifestyles? To what extent is the squeeze a temporary consequence of the recession and its aftermath, 
and to what extent is it the result of deeper changes in our economy? And are households on lower 
incomes being affected any differently from the average household, or are they simply being swept along 
on the ebb and flow of the economic tide? 
This paper identifies new evidence that, because of a new inflation environment, hard times started 
significantly earlier for households on lower incomes than for the average UK household. Because the 
costs of essential goods and services have been rising much faster than standard rates of inflation for 
some time, households on modest incomes have fared far worse than official data suggests. More and 
more are struggling to achieve a minimum standard of living. Looking forwards, these lower-income 
households could largely miss out on the fruits of a slow recovery; following a substantial decline in their 
living standards, they may see little or no improvement during the next decade.  
The story to date 
In the past year, work from the Resolution Foundation has developed a growing understanding of some 
key aspects of the present squeeze on living standards. It is now clear that growth in wages in the bottom 
half of the distribution was weak long before the recession. Median wages have been flat in real terms 
since around 2002 or 2003, while wages at the 10th percentile have performed better, but have been 
relatively flat since around 2005. These are worrying trends, contrasting with steady real wage growth 
from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. Yet until recently, the impact of these trends on household 
income has been moderated by government support. In fact, even during the 2008-2009 recession, 
average household incomes did not fall, helped by low inflation offsetting the effect of flat wages, and by 
some initially favourable aspects of the tax and benefits system – including increases in support through 
tax credits, especially for families with children.1 
Today, on the other hand, a combination of falling real earnings, falling government support and 
substantial rises in the cost of items from food to petrol and household energy are hitting the living 
standards of people across the income spectrum, with the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimating that real 
household incomes fell 3.5% last year.2 For the average household that stays in work, real disposable 
income could be 9% lower a year from now than it was two years ago.3  Given that between 2000 and 
2008, average real disposable income grew by about 15%, this could be seen as an adjustment rather than 
a collapse in overall living standards. With lower inflation promised soon, the erosion of buying power is 
set to level off, and even a slow return to growth could prevent a further fall in average real household 
income beyond 2013 (although forecasts beyond that point remain subject to huge uncertainty).  Even so, 
such a significant fall in income is unprecedented in the post Second World War period. Overall, a story 
emerges of government support helping to moderate the squeeze during the recession, but since then 
having been outpaced by events. 
                                                        
1
 See for example Robert Joyce, “Bleak outlook for living standards”, Public Finance, 15 September 2011 
2
 Robert Joyce, “Bleak outlook for living standards”, Public Finance, 15 September 2011 
3
 See projections presented below 
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The importance of inflation 
However, for many families, especially those on relatively modest means, this story of a squeeze on 
incomes that began only after the recession, and which should start to reverse in due course, is less 
plausible. For them, the squeeze in living standards is not just a fact of the present but has roots in the 
past and could persist into the future. This paper explains why. Specifically, it adds a deeper 
understanding of two critical factors to the Resolution Foundation’s past analysis: 
First, the slowing of growth in state transfer income – benefits but, in particular tax credits – for low to 
middle income households. The current government has pegged these to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), 
a lower index of inflation than has been used in the past. Moreover, given the tight control over public 
spending projected for the next few years, the large increases above indexation to some benefits seen at 
various times since 1998 look unlikely to be repeated. Indeed, following the recent cancellation of an 
above-inflation increase in the child element of Child Tax Credit, together with the freezing of Working Tax 
Credit and a wide range of other cuts, support through tax credits is now set to fall rather than rise in real 
terms for the foreseeable future.  While income transfers are often seen as affecting mainly people out of 
work, they now account for a substantial share of the income of many working families on low earnings, 
especially those with children.4 These changes will substantially reduce the adequacy of state protection 
for low earners against poor wage performance and higher inflation. Their full impact is only now 
becoming apparent. 
Second, and just as importantly, the structure of inflation has changed. The prices of commodities, 
including food and fuel, and of some other items comprising a disproportionate share of lower-income 
households’ spending, like public transport and council tax, have been rising faster than average. The 
result is that the cost of a basket of essential goods has, for some time, been rising faster than general 
inflation. The effect is that the cost of a minimum living standard of living is rising faster than the average 
cost of living. As a consequence, people on lower incomes are doing worse, relative to such a standard, 
than is implied by income statistics using general inflation indices to represent changes in “real terms”. 
Even before the shift to CPI uprating, and before the recession, this effect appears to have caused a 
significant fall in the buying power of these groups’ incomes. Importantly, this shift appears to be less the 
result of the impact of the downturn, and more the result of a new inflation environment. As such, it may 
well endure over the long term, rather than being specific to any single inflationary period such as that 
experienced in 2011. 
Throughout the analysis, the paper looks at the situation for households with low to middle incomes - 
those not in deep poverty, but with living standards not far from an acceptable minimum. For them, the 
squeeze on incomes typically started in around 2005, might already have reduced the value of incomes by 
about 10% and could continue to erode living standards well after a return to growth in real wages.  Thus, 
while everyone is having to tighten their belts during tough economic times, we risk seeing a long-term 
divergence of living standards in which people on below average incomes experience a longer and deeper 
decline than the better off.   
This paper: 
 Considers the origin of and future prospects for price trends that are pushing up the relative cost 
of affording the essentials of life 
                                                        
4
 See Mike Brewer and Liam Wren‐Lewis, Why did Britain's households get richer? Decomposing UK household income growth 
between 1968 and 2008‐09 (IFS analysis for the Resolution Foundation), 2011.   
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 Uses new analysis to measure what happened to the ability of people on modest means to afford 
a minimum acceptable living standard between 2000 and 2009  
 Gives some indicative future scenarios 
 Sketches out some implications for the kinds of policy areas that will become increasingly central 
to living standards 
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Section 1: Recent trends in the prices of basic goods  
"Inflation”, wrote David Piachaud in 1978, “acts neither as Robin Hood nor as Robber Baron: neither 
the poor not the rich are affected in a uniform way”.5 He went on to note, however, that the 
distributional impact of inflation will be linked to its underlying causes, which may be different in 
various places and times. He also pointed out that, other things being equal, lower income groups may 
find it harder to cope with shifting prices because they have less capacity to switch their patterns of 
consumption in response. 
Inflation has returned as a significant economic phenomenon for the first time in 20 years. Its 
character and causes have changed greatly since double-digit rises dominated the economic news in 
the late 1970s. Then, there were debates about whether “wage-push” or “demand-pull” factors were 
most important, but both were tied up with structural features of the domestic UK economy. Today, 
the dominant feature causing inflation to run at over double its target rate is rising world commodity 
prices, including the price of energy. These prices have been highly volatile over recent years, and will 
continue to be so, suggesting that high inflation rates are becoming a recurring rather than permanent 
feature of the UK economy (in 2012 they are forecast to be in abeyance). However, the long-term 
trend has been upwards, and is likely to continue to be so. The growth of China, India and other 
emerging economies, combined with supply-related and environment-related constraints on the 
extraction and use of fossil fuels, are pushing up the price of raw materials and energy. None of those 
underlying drivers is likely to disappear in the foreseeable future, and we should certainly expect them 
to be active in the next ten years.6  
The effect of these global price rises on the cost of physical essentials in the UK has two main 
consequences relevant to the distributional impact of inflation. The first is that people on low incomes 
tend to consume more than the average amount of such essentials as a proportion of their incomes. 
We can therefore expect them to suffer higher than average inflation rates when these items are going 
up faster than others. In other words, a global inflation environment that puts pressures on key goods 
like food and fuel has serious long-term consequences for the living standards of people on low and 
modest incomes over and above the simple consequences that are seen in a higher headline rate of 
inflation. 
The second is that the standard economic response of consumers to changing relative prices – to shift 
consumption away from things that have become more expensive – may not be an option, especially 
for the worst off. If the price of some kinds of non-essential items rises quickly, households can readily 
switch away from these items to spend more on other things that are becoming relatively cheaper, 
and thus limit the overall rise in the cost of a “shopping basket” with a given overall value. This is 
because, for example, eating out may be a valid alternative to going to the cinema as a way of enjoying 
an evening. By stark contrast, a family spending just enough on food to have an acceptable diet cannot 
shift expenditure to, say, electronic goods if they become cheaper while food becomes more 
expensive, without damaging their living standards. In simple terms, consuming other things does not 
substitute for buying enough food.  The results is that, as well as being relatively disadvantaged by a 
global inflation environment that pushes up the prices of basic goods, families on low and middle 
incomes may also be less able to adapt. 
                                                        
5
 David Piachaud (1978), “Inflation and Income Distribution” in Fred Hirsch and John H Goldthorpe (eds), The Political Economy of 
Inflation, Salisbury: Martin Robertson  
6
 For further discussion of these trends and their effects on the price of essentials in the UK, see Donald Hirsch and Kim Perren 
and Viet-Hai Phung (2011), Global influences on the cost of a minimum standard of living in the UK, York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 
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But how serious overall are higher rates of inflation for lower income groups, and to what extent have 
relative gains in some years offset relative losses in others? Most headline statistics on wages and 
incomes do little to help us to answer this important question. That’s because, although they take into 
account inflation, they are based on average measures like the CPI or RPI. As such, although they help 
us to differentiate between the impact on living standards of periods of high and low inflation, they do 
not distinguish the relative effects on different groups due to the prices of different categories of 
goods and services rising at different rates. This paper therefore uses a different concept, the 
Box 1: What is a minimum standard of living – and how much does it cost? 
A key difficulty in studying the impact of our economic environment on living standards over time is finding a 
measure that captures changes in the kind of life that households can afford to live. One important concern is 
whether people’s income gets them above a basic acceptable threshold.  But what should this threshold be? 
Traditionally, a common measure has been a threshold of “relative poverty”, set arbitrarily at 60% of median 
income, which helps to track over time whether people on low incomes are falling behind everyone else. This 
“relative” approach is justified by the fact that over the long term, social norms change and so does the 
definition of an acceptable minimum income. However, for short-term changes, another measure – an 
“absolute” poverty line – whose level does not change in real terms, can also be useful in showing whether 
more or fewer people can afford a fixed set of goods and services. 
The problem in both cases is knowing whether the level selected really does represent a socially acceptable 
minimum standard of living. The Minimum Income Standard project tries to provide a useful measure to help 
with this problem.* Since 2008, it has used focus groups to identify what the British public consider to be the 
basket of goods that is necessary for a minimum acceptable standard of living. This basket of goods has been 
developed for a wide range of different household types – couples and single people, those with and without 
children, and those who are retired and not. To give an example, the basket of goods for a couple with two 
children includes: 
 £104 of food a week 
 Travel by bus, but no car 
 A week’s self-catering holiday a year in the UK 
 Very occasional treats for children like going to the cinema, buying a comic book or eating out at 
McDonalds – adding up to £15 a month for a primary school child 
This basic ‘minimum standard of living’ basket of goods (the ‘MIS basket’) is useful in helping us understand 
changes in living standards over time. Specifically, it performs several functions. It can be used to understand 
how the price of a minimum standard of living is changing over time in a non-arbitrary way, including 
whether these changes are different from the overall average of price changes in the economy. It helps us 
understand how many people are able to afford a minimum standard of living, and how this is changing over 
time. And, for groups in society that spend most of their income on this basket (groups, in general, with low 
or modest incomes), it helps us understand how they are experiencing different price pressures than others. 
* See www.minimumincomestandard.org This research was initially carried out in 2008 by the Centre for 
Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at Loughborough University with the Family Budget Unit at the University of 
York, and is updated regularly by CRSP in line with rising prices and changing attitudes towards contemporary 
minimum needs. 
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‘minimum income standard’ (MIS), to help us understand the impact of these important trends on 
families with relatively low incomes. (See Box 1.) The MIS is a concept, developed by the Centre for 
Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at Loughborough University with the Family Budget Unit at the 
University of York, which uses public consensus to identify the basket of goods that is needed to reach 
a minimum standard of living. In simple terms, it is the basic basket of goods that households need to 
buy to make ends meet. One important use of this concept is that it gives us a benchmark to consider 
how price movements have changed the cost of a minimum acceptable living standard over recent 
years. This method does not take account of how the basket itself might have change d over time as 
social norms change, but instead isolates the effect of inflation on a constant basket. It gives a 
reasonable basis for considering the overall inflation rate for people on modest incomes, based on the 
proportion of the minimum household budget that is allocated to different broad spending categories 
such as food, household goods and clothing, and on the published inflation rates for these categories. 
For these low and modest income households, changes in the cost of the ‘MIS basket’ are a much 
better representation of changes in their costs of living than either the CPI or RPI rate of inflation.   
Figure 1 uses the minimum basket of goods – which, as explained in Box 1, we can call the ‘MIS’ basket – 
to show how the prices of this group of essential goods has changed by comparison to the overall rates of 
inflation as shown in the RPI and CPI. The “MISPI” is an index of price movements based on spending 
categories weighted according to the Minimum Income Standard budgets of 2008.  This index focuses on 
disposable income requirements, and does not include housing costs. The results confirm that the price of 
a minimum basket of goods has been rising faster than inflation indices that reflect average levels of 
spending, and not just in the recent past.  
Figure 1 shows that over the past decade, the cost of the minimum basket has risen 43% while the RPI 
basket costs 35% more than it did in 2001 and the CPI basket, the future basis for benefit and tax credit 
ratings, has appreciated only by 27%. The divergence between MISPI and CPI has been consistent, while 
the increase relative to RPI has been more recent, based largely on the fact that cheaper mortgages  due 
to lower interest rates are reflected in RPI but not in the other two indices shown here.  
Figure 1: The rising price of a basic basket of goods compared to CPI and RPI  
Index, 2001 = 100, 2001-2011 
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Which categories of goods and services have driven this shift? The rising relative price of several 
categories of commodity in particular have pushed up the growing cost of a minimum basket of goods 
compared to an average household budget over the past decade. The rising prices of food, domestic fuel, 
water, council tax and public transport prices have been the most important. Figures 2 and 3 show how 
these prices have risen, relative to RPI inflation, during the past decade and, for comparison, the previous 
decade.7 
Figures 2 and 3 show that while all five of these categories rose in price faster than overall RPI in the 
2000s, the detailed pattern is more complex. The graphs show first that commodity-driven inflation is a 
relatively new phenomenon. Food has been rising fastest since 2008 and fuel since 2004.  Both these 
categories fell relative to general inflation in the 1990s, a time of steady real income growth, meaning that 
overall they became much more affordable. For example, the cost of food was about a quarter lower, 
relative to average incomes, in 2000 than in 1990. These trends have now started to reverse. Even though 
the cumulative rise in the relative cost of food has so far been modest compared to some other items 
shown here, the high share of food in a minimum budget means the impact is considerable. 
Figure 2: Annual inflation rates in key categories relative to overall RPI 
Category-level inflation relative to RPI, 1990-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7
 Since inflation rates shown here are based on RPI categories and calculations, a comparison with the RPI index gives a better 
idea than with CPI of whether inflation is faster than average impact on each category. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative price rises in key categories in the 1990s and 2000s 
Percentage change 
 
This finding is very important to the story of living standards in the past 20 years and, if these trends were 
to continue, will be similarly important in the coming decades. In simple terms, it means that, in the 1990s, 
changes in the price of food, council tax and household fuel, were positive forces, making people on low 
and modest incomes feel better off than might have been expected from headline figures for incomes and 
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Section 2: The impact of the new inflation on living standards 
What impact has the relatively high increase in the cost of a minimum basket of goods and services had 
on the living standards of people on modest incomes during the past decade?  We can answer this 
question by comparing changes in the cost of the MIS basket of goods explained above with trends in the 
incomes of different types of households. At a headline level, we find that many households in Britain, 
including many containing people in work, struggle to afford an acceptable standard of living. Roughly 
30% of working-age households have incomes too low to afford the very basic basket of goods and 
services that is commonly believed to be a reasonable minimum. 
Importantly, for households with incomes close to this level, the MIS-based prices index we set out in 
Figure 1 is a closer representation of the actual rise in the cost of living than indices such as CPI, which are 
based on the distribution of average spending. This allows us to use the new inflation figure defined above 
– the MISPI – to understand what has really happened to the spending power of low to modest income 
households in the past decade. 
To consider the effect of inflation and income levels on such groups, the following analysis looks at two 
groups of working-age households. One group is around the 40th percentile of the overall income 
distribution (adjusted for household size), towards the upper end of the ‘low to middle income’ (LMI) 
group focused on by the Resolution Foundation. This group typically has disposable income around 20-
25% higher than the price of our basic basket of goods; in other words, they are able to buy this basket 
each month and have a little left over. Another group is around the 20th percentile of the distribution, 
towards the lower end of the Resolution Foundation’s LMI group. People on these incomes typically have 
disposable income 15-20% too low to afford the MIS basket of goods. In other words, they have to forego 
some very basic items that would widely be deemed necessary for a minimum standard of living. 
It is revealing that both of these groups do much less well relative to the minimum standard than a 
household on average income. Because of the way that household income is distributed, the average 
household is far better off than a household at the 40th percentile, and has disposable income around 70% 
higher than the price of our MIS basket. One important result of this fact, which is central to the analysis 
of this paper, is that the price of a basic basket of goods is therefore likely to represent the spending 
patterns of an average income household far less well than it does the spending patterns of our low to 
modest income households. In other words, indices based on average spending, like the CPI or RPI, are 
much more appropriate for households at the average than for households on lower incomes. 
A household around the 40th percentile, then – one with less income, adjusted for household size, than 
three fifths of the population - has considerably less than mean average income, but somewhat more than 
enough to afford a minimum acceptable living standard. Such households can be characterised as being 
on “modest” means - able to keep their heads above water, but with not much to spare. The issue for 
them, over time, is the extent to which they can enjoy a lifestyle above the bare minimum: how much 
“headroom” do they have after covering the basics in life. Since individual needs vary greatly, there will be 
many households in this category with greater than minimum costs who are still struggling to get by. 
Critically, as we will see, very small movements around this level can feel very significant in terms of how 
their day to day life relates to a minimum standard of living. 
A household around the 20th percentile, on the other hand, is likely not to be able to meet its needs 
adequately. While its members may not live in dire hardship, they will have to forego things that are 
normally expected as part of life in modern Britain. A child in such a household, for example, may never 
get a holiday, even in the UK, or may lack opportunities such as taking part in after school activities that 
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are taken for granted by his or her peers. The amount that such a family will have to forego may grow or 
shrink over time according to how far they are below the minimum standard. Again, small changes in the 
extent to which a household is below this minimum standard have very big impacts on how much they 
have to forego, as we will see. 
The analysis therefore considers how the average income of people in these groups currently somewhat 
above and somewhat below MIS has been changing relative to the cost of the minimum basket. It looks at 
net income after the household has paid tax and national insurance, received tax credits and benefits and 
paid rent or mortgage and any childcare costs. Thus it compares the household’s disposable income to 
what it needs to spend to reach the minimum standard. Details of how this calculation has been made and 
what exactly it represents are in Appendix 1. 
Figure 4 shows the overall results between the beginning of the century to financial year 2008/09, the 
most recent year for which detailed data on household incomes are currently available.8 
Figure 4: How incomes at the 20th and 40th percentile compare to a basic basket of goods 
Percentage income is above or below the cost of a ‘MIS’ basket of goods, all working age households 
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new inflation environment.  
                                                        
8
 Overall income data are available for 2009/10, and these are referred to below, but the detail has not yet been released in a 
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As suggested above, an important feature of these results is that what otherwise may look like a relatively 
minor change in income level can have substantial effects on the ability to meet one’s needs.  For 
example, a single person whose weekly disposable income goes from £208 a week (120 percent of the 
price of the basic basket of goods) to being [189 pounds a week] (110 percent) might seem to have only 
seen a small reduction in their standard of living. In fact, they have seen the amount of income they have 
leftover after buying a minimum basket of goods – what might be called their ‘discretionary cash’ – cut in 
half. As we have found above, dramatic changes of this type have indeed taken place since 2005 in the UK. 
A household at the 40th percentile, for example, has seen their breathing room above the basic minimum 
basket fall from 30 percent to 23 percent – a  reduction by a quarter in their discretionary cash in just 
three years. More starkly still, the shortfall below the minimum faced by households at the 20th percentile 
has grown from 11% to 17% in the same period, an increase by one half in the value of essential items 
that such families must go without.  Critically, these changes took place before the onset of the 2008/09 
recession, and are principally the result of recent changes in the nature of inflation that are not fully 
captured in the headline rate. Because of a general reliance on avearge measures of inflation, the scale of 
these shifts in living standards are not commonly understood. 
Figure 5 puts these changes in context by comparing what has happened to average incomes in the same 
period. It compares average incomes adjusted for the RPI (the most appropriate measure for these 
households) with low and modest incomes adjusted for the MISPI (which is, as we have seen, the most 
appropriate measure for these households). In the first half of the decade, the rate of improvement was 
similar at the mean to that of the 20th percentile (though somewhat faster than the 40th percentile). But 
since 2005, average incomes flattened  in real terms, while the value of modest incomes fell very 
dramatically. The result is that average households went into the recession around 15% better off than 
they had been in 2000 while, by stark contrast, lower income households entered the downturn little 
better off than they had been in 2000. 
 
Figure 5: Changes in the real value of incomes 
Average incomes controlled for average inflation compared to low and modest income controlled for the 
changing price of a basket of goods 
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This pattern of living standards is not seen in official income distribution statistics,  which compare real 
incomes against an index based on average spending patterns. In other words, families with close to 
minimum incomes did worse between 2005 and 2009, not because their actual incomes grew more slowly 
but because the more rapid rise in the cost of what they consume  meant that they could buy fewer goods 
and services. Families on higher incomes have done relatively better in this pre-recession period not 
simply because their incomes have performed better, but because their spending habits have left them 
less vulnerable to trends in inflation.9  
How have these trends played out for different types of household?  Figures 6 and 7 show that for 
households without children, the gains earlier in the decade were smaller, and the proportion of these 
gains subsequently lost was greater, than families with children. This particularly applies to the 40th 
percentile, where the gain from 2000 to 2005 for families without children was worth the equivalent of 
7% of a minimum budget, whereas for families with children it was worth 13%.  For both groups, the 
subsequent decline was worth 7% of a minimum budget, meaning that those without children were back 
at the same position relative to this budget as they had been in 2000, while families with children retained 
nearly half of the gain. At the 20th percentile, these differences were less stark, with families with children 
losing 60% of their initial gain compared to 80% for households without children. 
Figure 6: How incomes in households without children at the 20th and 40th percentiles compare to the 
cost of a minimum basket of goods 
                                                        
9
 One important point in understanding Figure 5 is that the comparisons with a minimum standard are based on the changing cost 
of a minimum basket of goods and services as defined at a point in time, 2008. It does not take account of potential changes in 
the level of the minimum as a result of the continued growth in general affluence in the first part of the decade. Had the MIS 
research been carried out in 2000, it might have identified a more modest level of income, required to reach a minimum 
acceptable standard of living in relatively less prosperous times. To the extent that growth in general living standards causes the 
minimum to grow, it is possible that low income households did not improve their position relative to the minimum during 2000-
2005, even while enjoying an absolute improvement in living standards. In relative terms, they were considerably worse off 
around the end of the decade than at the beginning. 
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Percentage above or below the cost of the basic basket of goods 
 
 
 
Figure 6: How incomes in households with children at the 20th and 40th percentiles compare to the cost 
of a minimum basket of goods 
Percentage above or below the cost of the basic basket of goods 
 
 
These differences correspond to the fact that the Government substantially increased support for families 
on modest incomes through the tax credit system during the early part of the decade, and again from 
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2008 onwards. While some adults without children became eligible for tax credits in 2003, the bulk of the 
benefit has gone to families with children. Increasing participation rates among lone parents early in the 
decade also boosted incomes among this group, whose overall income profile is tilted towards the lower 
end of the overall distribution. 
These effects can be seen more clearly for different household types in Figures 8 and 9. Lone parents 
whose incomes are currently around the 20th percentile and the 40th percentile of the overall distribution 
both saw much greater relative rises early in the decade than other groups, although in the case of the 
40th percentile there was a significant offsetting loss more recently.10   In contrast, single people on 
modest incomes saw no gain in their ability to afford a minimum budget over the period as a whole, and 
in the case of those at the 40th percentile, losses from 2005 to 2009 outweighed earlier gains. Among 
families with children, couples with one child have done worst. Since the most generous increases for 
families with children have been through the child element of the Child Tax Credit, an amount that varies 
per child, these gains have the least impact in households where the ratio of children to adults is the 
lowest. Overall, among low to modest income households, in the eight years leading up to the recession, 
only lone parents and couples with large numbers of children saw a significant overall improvement in 
their living standards, with these groups seeing sufficiently substantial increases in government assistance 
to offset the malign effects of poor earnings performance and a more malign inflation environment. 
 
Figure 8: Change in incomes at the 20th percentile relative to the cost of a basic basket of goods 
Percentage change in the period, controlled for changes in the price of a basic basket of goods 
 
 
Figure 8: Change in incomes at the 40th percentile relative to the cost of a basic basket of goods 
Percentage change in the period, controlled for changes in the price of a basic basket of goods  
                                                        
10
 Note that the definition of each group is calibrated around the overall income distribution in 2008/9. In practice, among a 
group that has gained relative position in this distribution, the section whose incomes are being compared over time will have 
started at a lower part of the overall distribution. See Appendix 1. 
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Section 3: Looking to the future  
The above analysis shows that in the years leading up to the recession, the ability of households on 
modest incomes to afford an acceptable living standard had started to decline, at a time when average 
household incomes were flat in real terms but not falling. Even before the recession hit, a very significant 
change in the inflation environment had wiped out much of the gain in real incomes achieved in the last 
decade. 
One immediate question that arises from this striking finding is whether this new inflation environment is 
here to stay?  That is a difficult question to answer. But current data do allow us to estimate what has 
happened since the 2008/09 recession hit and, from respected forecasts of the next few years, to show 
illustrative projections of what could happen in the years ahead. In both cases, it must be emphasised that 
the following are not forecasts, but rather illustrations based on some stated assumptions. Their purpose 
is not to predict the future but to show how, structurally, the effect of current economic conditions and 
policies could affect the absolute and relative living standards of people on modest incomes. 
In the case of the recent past, this analysis is based on estimates from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
and, up to 2015, on Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecasts and the assumption (also adopted by 
the IFS in its modelling) that changes in prices and earnings from 2015 to 2020 remain at the 2015 rate. 
In applying these estimates to project changes in living standards, three main additional assumptions are 
made: 
 That the difference between CPI inflation and MIS inflation remains the same in future as the 
average for the past five years 
 That cash incomes on average grow at the same rate as the cash earnings projections made by the 
OBR       
 That cash incomes for people on below average incomes grow in proportion to a weighted 
average of earnings and CPI (representing growth in benefits), with the assumption that 
households at the 40th percentile get twice as much income in earnings than benefits, and at the 
20th percentile the reverse.  
The basis for the projections is set out in more detail in Appendix 2, and the sensitivity of the following 
analysis to the accuracy of the assumptions that underlie the projections is discussed below. Figure 10 
shows the results of these projections, extending the trends shown in Figure 5 above.  
These estimates and projections suggest first that we are presently in a period of rapid contraction in 
average incomes, likely to be particularly severe in 2010-11 and 2011-12. Further falls for people on 
modest incomes could be less severe than average, since those with some benefit and tax credit income, 
pegged to prices, will have part of their incomes protected in real terms (and also because the “MIS 
inflation” rate is presently low relative to the ROSSI inflation rate used when calculating real disposable 
incomes). However, by 2013, when real earnings are forecast by the OBR to start rising again, average 
living standards for people on modest incomes could have fallen to below their 2000 levels, while those 
on average incomes remain better off than at the beginning of this century. 
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Figure 10: Projected changes in the real value of incomes 
Average incomes controlled for average inflation compared to low and modest income controlled for the 
changing price of a basket of goods 
 
Looking further ahead, Figure 10 illustrates how a return to modest earnings growth of about 1.5% in real 
terms on average could leave people on modest incomes with living standards that remain low compared 
to previous levels: on this projection, still below what they were in 2000. This is due to the combined 
effect of higher than average inflation rates and having part of household income pegged to an inflation 
index that lags well behind both earnings and the real extra costs that these households face. In the case 
of households at the 20th percentile of income, the higher component of assumed benefit income could 
mean that living standards continue to decline for the foreseeable future.  
How plausible are these projections as an illustration of the pattern of change in living standards in the 
coming years? As with any projections, particularly in the present uncertain economic environment, huge 
uncertainty surrounds the assumptions on which they are based. The projections are not therefore 
forecasts, but we can distinguish two aspects of how helpful they are in envisaging the future: the timing 
of a return to growth and the distribution of the fruits of that growth. 
On the first of these, we must acknowledge that nobody can accurately predict when or how rapidly there 
may be a return to growth that causes overall living standards to rise in real terms. The OBR forecasts that 
by the middle of this decade, wages will be growing by 4.5% a year and inflation will be 2-3% on different 
measures. The uncertainty over world economic conditions makes it hard to be confident that this will be 
the case. However, it may be reasonable to assume that at some point in the next few years the tide will 
turn in this direction. Therefore, the right-hand side of Figure 10 may be taken as a picture of who will 
benefit from a return to growth, rather than a forecast of precisely when this will occur. 
But how accurate is that pattern – showing a divergence between the fortunes of average and lower-
income households – likely to be? This depends on the accuracy of two further assumptions.  First, that 
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
2
0
0
0
/0
1
2
0
0
1
/0
2
2
0
0
2
/0
3
2
0
0
3
/0
4
2
0
0
4
/0
5
2
0
0
5
/0
6
2
0
0
6
/0
7
2
0
0
7
/0
8
2
0
0
8
/0
9
2
0
0
9
/1
0
2
0
1
0
/1
1
2
0
1
1
/1
2
2
0
1
2
/1
3
2
0
1
3
/1
4
2
0
1
4
/1
5
2
0
1
5
/1
6
2
0
1
6
/1
7
2
0
1
7
/1
8
2
0
1
8
/1
9
2
0
1
9
/2
0
In
d
ex
, 2
00
0/
01
=1
00
Real median after housing costs Real mean after housing costs
20th percentile adjusted for cost of minimum basket 40th percentile adjusted for cost of minimum basket
ProjectionEstimated
  
         Resolution Foundation            Page 18 
incomes for households relying heavily on benefits and tax credits will diverge from those of the average 
household. This assumption is heavily subject to future policy decisions, but present signs are not looking 
good. The long-term pegging of benefits and tax credits to the Consumer Prices Index, which 
systematically rises more slowly than other inflation indices, signals the Government’s desire to contain 
increases in the welfare bill. Were the CPI to be rising at 2% and wages at 4.5% as forecast by the OBR, the 
“default” policy position would be for the incomes of people heavily dependent on state transfers 
(including many people in work and in receipt of tax credits) to fall substantially relative to those of 
people just dependent on wage income.  
The second assumption driving this divergence is that the cost of essentials will rise relative to overall 
inflation, causing those whose spending is mainly on essentials to do poorly relative to the average. This 
assumption is subject to more uncertainty, especially from one year to the next, as prices of commodities 
have been highly volatile. However, as argued in Section 2 above, long-term pressures in the world 
economy make it highly likely that over the next decade the global price of resources and especially 
energy will continue on an upward trend. This makes the differential inflation rates used in these 
projections highly plausible in projecting the long terms pattern of living standards, even though the year 
to year projections are likely to be inaccurate.  At the very least, these illustrations show the extent to 
which the living standards of people on low incomes in the UK will be highly vulnerable to global 
influences.  
  
  
         Resolution Foundation            Page 19 
Implications for policy  
What are the implications for policy of the analysis set out in this paper? Even before our findings about 
differential inflation rates are taken into account, recent trends in earnings, income and general inflation 
present us with some inescapable facts about future trends in living standards for low to middle income 
households that paint a very pessimistic picture. 
First, because households on lower incomes now receive large proportions of their income from 
government support, even if future wage growth is even across the economy (rather than highly unequal 
as it has been in recent decades), households on lower incomes will fall behind unless government 
support also rises in line with earnings. Second, the government’s decision to move from the RPI to the 
CPI measure of inflation as the uprating mechanism for most benefits and tax credits means that 
government support will in fact now rise more slowly than in the past, and much more slowly than 
earnings. Third, planned real reductions in government support over and above this indexing change will 
mean that many aspects of support will rise even more slowly than CPI, seeing real terms cuts. 
Put another way, in order to believe that low to middle income households will not fall further and further 
behind higher income households in the coming years, we would need to believe one or more of the 
following: 
 That wages will grow more quickly at the lower end of the distribution than they do at the top for 
a sustained period of time, in a way they have not in the last three decades  
 That there will be a sudden and dramatic reversal of government policy on benefits and tax 
credits (and therefore a change in the government’s overall fiscal policy), reversing not only the 
shift from RPI to CPI (which saves £11 billion by 2015-16) but also pledging substantial above-
inflation increases in spend 
 That employment rates and/or hours worked will, over a sustained period of time, rise far more 
quickly in low income households than they do in higher income households 
Overall, then, there is little reason to believe that disposable incomes will perform well, even against 
standard, average measures of inflation. Our findings on the impact of a new, more malign inflation 
environment add an additional challenge. They mean that the task of preventing low to middle income 
households from falling behind now faces even stronger headwinds. With the cost of an essential basket 
of goods now rising significantly faster than general inflation, more and more low to middle income 
households will not just fall behind those above them, but also behind what is widely considered to be a 
minimum acceptable standard of living. For those who can currently afford this basket of goods, their 
breathing space will get increasingly restricted. For the surprising numbers of households who are already 
below this standard, more and more basic goods will have to be foregone. Before the 2008/09 recession, 
this new inflation environment had already wiped out all the gains in living standards that lower income 
households had achieved in the early 2000s. If they continue, living standards will be appreciably lower 
come 2020. 
When it comes to policy - especially in the context of severe fiscal constraints - the new importance of 
inflation for social outcomes should cause the Government to look for every feasible way of keeping the 
price of essential goods and services down. Of course, in reality very significant parts of this picture are 
beyond the control of UK policymakers. Global price pressures on commodities, for example, will not yield 
to policy decisions in the UK. This makes it all the more important that everything possible is done in the 
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few areas in which we do have purchase. What aspects of government policy become more important in 
this environment? 
For one, it is important that we are not naïve to the impact on living standards of reduced public subsidies 
for key goods and services where these reductions feed through into higher prices for consumers. This 
shift from public to private expenditure has been a key dynamic of the past 30 years and its full 
implications for living standards have been obscured by a general tendency to focus only on headline 
rates of inflation. To take one example, in the case of public transport, far more priority could be given to 
maximising the use of public subsidies and franchising agreements to control costs for low to middle 
income consumers, in particular for those reliant on public transport for work. 
Other areas of public policy may also deserve a higher priority. Efforts to exert downward pressure on 
energy prices, whether through increased competition or the greater use of redistributive mechanisms 
like social tariffs, are one. Another may be the reform of Council Tax to reduce pressures on low income 
households, a group that have suffered from above inflation increases in Council Tax at the bottom 
coupled with the failure of rates to keep track with rising property prices at the top. 
Ultimately, the only sure way for a government to preserve the living standards of those relying on 
payments from the state and facing high inflation rates is to ensure that these payments rise in line with 
people’s real living costs. This would mean using an uprating index that reflects these costs much more 
fairly than the Consumer Prices Index. In the short term, fiscal austerity would make such a change 
extremely difficult. At the very least, the Government should be acutely aware of the increased 
importance of inflation in influencing inequalities. Prices are today a more salient issue for social policy 
than they have been for many years.     
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Appendix 1: How incomes around the 20th and 40th percentiles 
are compared to MIS requirements  
This paper has set out to track the incomes, relative to need, of households at particular points of the 
income distribution – namely those with income, adjusted for household composition, that is higher than 
about a fifth and lower than four fifths of households (20th percentile) and those with income higher than 
two fifths and lower than three fifths of households (40th percentile). This calculation has been made 
based on the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for each year between 2000/01 and 2008/10. We have 
looked at the “after housing cost” definition of income used in that survey, which also deducts direct 
taxes and council taxes from reported income, and in addition we have deducted reported childcare costs, 
to give a “net” figure comparable to the basic weekly budgets specified in MIS. 
One possibility would have been to consider in each year a set of households whose adjusted incomes are 
close to the relevant points in the distribution (e.g. close to the 20th percentile), and work out for each of 
them how their actual incomes compared to the needs specified for that household in MIS. The problem 
with this method is that it would not have been effective in tracking changes in the relative fortunes of 
different groups over time. If for example single adults on low incomes became worse off relative to other 
household types from one year to the next, our selection of single adults at the 20th percentile of the 
overall distribution would simply be further up the distribution of single adults in the later year, since 
more single adults would be relatively far down the overall distribution.  At a particular percentile of the 
adjusted distribution, all households types will always seem about equally well off: that is the point of the 
adjustment (“equivalisation”). 
Another possibility would have been to look consistently at households at or around the 20th percentile of 
each household group. This would have allowed us to look at a comparable group of people from one year 
to the next, and to note where worse-off people within one household type are doing better or worse 
over time than worse-off people in another type of household. However, this would have meant 
comparing households at very different levels of living standards in different household types. Most lone 
parents have relatively low incomes: the majority have below 70% median income after housing costs, the 
approximate level of MIS, meaning that a household at the 40th percentile of lone parent incomes has 
significantly less than its minimum needs. On the other hand, couples without children have a relatively 
prosperous income profile, with only one in six below 70% median, so even at the 20th percentile such 
families are above the minimum requirement.   This makes such a method a poor way of comparing how 
effectively different groups with just above or just below minimum incomes are managing to keep their 
heads above water. 
Instead, we used the following method. For each of a number of household types (all of working age), we 
considered about where in the distribution of incomes of those households someone would be if they 
were on 20 per cent of adjusted incomes in 2008/09. For example, we found that 29% of single people 
had adjusted incomes below the 20th percentile of all households – i.e. the 29th percentile of single 
people’s incomes coincides with the 20th percentile of all incomes. We therefore were interested in a 
group of single people close to the 29th percentile of single person households. To get a reasonable sized 
sample, we looked at the average income of single person households between the 25th and 35th 
percentile of such households – representing a sample of 10% of single people with incomes close to the 
20th percentile of the overall distribution.  We repeated this selection for all households, using a sample 
bounded by percentiles divisible by 5, e.g. 10th-20th, 15th-25th, 20th-30th etc, according to which of these 
decile groups the equivalent percentile was closest to the centre of. The following groups were used: 
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Family type 
Decile group around the 20th 
Percentile of all incomes 
Decile group around 40th 
Percentile of all incomes 
Single adult working age 25th-35th 40th-50th 
Couple working age 5th-15th 15th-25th 
Couple 1 child 10th-20th 25th-35th 
Couple 2 children 10th-20th 30th-40th 
Couple 3 children 20th-40th 55th-65th 
Lone parent 1 child 40th-50th 60th-70th 
Lone parent 2 children 40th-50th 65th-75th 
 
The analysis looked only at “single-unit” households, i.e. those with a single person or a couple plus any 
dependent children. We excluded couples with four or more and singles with three or more children, 
which involved much smaller samples for which we could not report statistically reliable comparisons of 
average incomes. 
For each household type, we then compared average actual income in each year to the cost of the 2008 
MIS budget requirement, adjusted for changes in prices using components of the Retail Prices Index. The 
average percentage difference between actual incomes in the relevant decile group and the MIS 
requirement is reported here. 
These percentages should be interpreted as showing the changing fortunes of the 10% of households in 
each type who were close to the 20th and 40th percentiles of the overall distribution in 2008/09. However, 
it is not valid to compare the precise position of this average across groups in any one year (e.g. to attach 
meaning to the fact that single people around the 20th percentile were 18% below and couples 20% below 
MIS in 2008/09), for two reasons. One is that the method looks at a group of people whose position in the 
overall distribution is not identical for each group – the commonality is that in each case it is 10% of that 
group, in a range that includes the 20th percentile overall. The other is that the relationship between the 
“equivalised” incomes using the official scales for adjusting for family size is not identical to the relative 
needs of families as measured in MIS, so part of the difference relates to the inaccuracy of equivalisation 
rather than differences in the fortunes of different groups. However, the change in the adequacy of 
incomes of different groups relative to MIS is directly comparable. In each case the data show how much 
better or worse off a section of the population in broadly the same position in the overall income 
distribution has become over time.  
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Appendix 2: The basis for the illustrative projections  
The estimates of present values and future projections shown in Figure 10 are not intended as forecasts 
as an illustration of how a number of factors could influence the relative movement of living standards for 
average and for lower income households. They were compiled on the basis of the following data and 
assumptions: 
 Average earnings, the Consumer Prices Index and the ROSSI index increase as observed up to 
calendar year 2010, as forecast for whole calendar years by the Office for Budget Responsibility 
for 2011-15 and at the same rate as 2015 for future years.11  
 MIS inflation is as observed to 2011 and thereafter at a rate equivalent to the forecast increase in 
the Consumer Prices Index for each calendar year plus the average difference between MISPI and 
CPI for the past five years (2006-2011), which is a “MIS inflation premium” of 1.33%. 
 Changes in mean and median household incomes are as reported in the HBAI figures for 2009/10, 
as estimated by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (-3.5%) for 2010/11 and thereafter at the projected 
rate of increase in real earnings, based on OBR calendar year projections for earnings and ROSSI 
inflation. (This means that from 2011/12 onwards the increases are estimated based on the main 
calendar year comprising each financial year – e.g. the 2011 forecast is used to estimate the 
situation in 2011/12)  
 Changes in cash incomes at the 20th and 40th percentiles are assumed to be weighted averages of 
projected earnings increases and the projected rise in the Consumer Prices Index, representing 
benefit income. The weightings used are 2:1 in favour of CPI/Benefits for the 20th percentile and 
2:1 in favour of earnings at the 40th percentile.12  The resulting estimates of cash income changes 
are then divided by MIS inflation to estimate the change in the value of income relative to MIS.  
  
                                                        
11
 OBR March 2011 Economic and Fiscal Outlook; OBR March 2011, ROSSI inflation forecast 
12
 Based on author estimates of the approximate distribution of income sources from 
http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/2020/documents/ESRC_preston%20FINAL.PDF page 13 
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